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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
v.
TERRILL C JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from an order dismissing eight counts of false evidences of
title and registration, a second degree felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to bind

defendant over for trial on eight counts of making a false statement in applications
for vehicle registration, where defendant, whose residence is located in Arizona,
stated on the applications that his residence was located in Utah.
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. See R. 67-68.

Standard of review: Magistrates have "some discretion to apply the probable
cause standard" to the facts presented at a preliminary hearing. State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29, Tf 34, 137 P.3d 787. "This discretion is limited, however, because in the
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is
limited. Accordingly, an appellate court should grant commensurate limited
deference to a magistrate's application of the bindover standard to the facts of each
case/' Id.
Whether the district court properly interpreted a statute is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. See State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 8, 84 R3d 1171.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this appeal involves interpretation of the following statutes:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315. Second degree felony—False evidences of
title and registration
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to:
(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for
registration, a certificate of title, or for a duplicate certificate of title;
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material
fact in an application under this chapter;
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter;
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card,
license plate, or permit issued by the division;
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to have
been issued by the division;
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title;
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(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter
knowing it has been altered, forged, or falsified; and
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien
information, when the person named on the application as lienholder does
not hold a valid security interest.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-209. Application for registration — Contents
(1) An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under this part shall
apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the division.
(2) The application for registration shall include:
(a) the signature of each owner of the vehicle to be registered;
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the owner,
or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm, association, or
corporation;
(c) a description of the vehicle including the make, model, type of
body, the model year as specified by the manufacturer, the number of
cylinders, and the identification number of the vehicle; and
(d) other information required by the division to enable it to
determine whether the owner is lawfully entitled to register the vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with eight counts of false evidences
of title and registration, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41la-1315(2) (West 2004). R. 1-3. A preliminary hearing was held on 7 July 2006 and
1 August 2006. R. 28-29,33-34. After further hearings on 11 September 2006 and 4
October 2006, the magistrate dismissed all charges. R. 53-54,66. The dismissal was
entered 4 October 2006. R. 67-68 (addendum A). The State timely appealed. See R.
72, 75.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Utah-Arizona border transects the communities of Hildale, Utah, and
Colorado City, Arizona, which are laid out on a single street grid. R. 89:30; State's
Ex.9.
Mark Adams, an investigator with the Office of Special Investigations of the
Arizona Department of Economic Security, investigated welfare fraud in connection
with approximately ten households, including defendant's, in Colorado City,
Arizona. R. 89:19-20,29-30. In the course of his investigation, Adams located two
addresses of record for defendant: 380 North Richard Street and 385 West Arizona
Avenue. R. 89:21-23. The two addresses identify a single site. R. 89: 23. The site
is located in Colorado City, Arizona, about two blocks south of the Utah border. R.
89: 21-24.
At various times, defendant registered eight vehicles with the Utah
Department of Motor Vehicles. On each application he gave his address as 385 West
Arizona Avenue or 385 North Richard Street, but he stated that this address was
located in Hildale Utah. R. 89:11-12, 22-23,46-49; State's Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 8.
It was much cheaper for defendant to register the vehicles in Utah than in
Arizona. R. 89: 61.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate's dismissal of eight counts of false evidences of title and
registration was error. At the preliminary hearing stage, a prosecutor need only
establish probable cause to believe that the charged crime was committed and that
the defendant committed it. This requires only some believable evidence of each
element of the crime. Here, those elements were that defendant (1) knowingly (2)
listed a false address (3) on a Utah motor vehicle registration application. The
prosecutor presented uncontested evidence of these elements at the preliminary
hearing. Indeed, the magistrate found that the addresses defendant represented on
his vehicle registration applications as being in Utah were in fact in Arizona.
The magistrate refused to bind over because the prosecution had failed to
establish, not any element of the charge, but various non-elements. For example, in
justifying his ruling, he noted that defendant's address could be physically located
and that correspondence mailed to the address would reach defendant. He also
expressed his belief that the victim of defendant's acts was the State of Arizona, not
the State of Utah. To dismiss based on such extraneous issues is an abuse of
discretion. The magistrate was apparently drawn off course by a 70-year-old Utah
case construing a different subsection of the predecessor of the statute under which
defendant was charged. The magistrate should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE STATEMENTS
ON EIGHT VEHICLE REGISTRATION APPLICATIONS
ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE COMMITTED
THE CRIME OF MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON A
VEHICLE REGISTRATION APPLICATION
The magistrate refused to bind defendant over on eight counts of giving false
evidences of title and registration. He did so despite finding that defendant had
made false statements on applications for Utah vehicle registration. This was error.
Magistrate's ruling. The magistrate entered an order dismissing all eight
counts of false evidences of title and registration. R. 67-68. He found that defendant
registered motor vehicles in the State of Utah using addresses that accurately located
defendant's residence and dairy on the Hildale/Colorado City grid. However, "the
locations were identified as Hildale, Utah addresses. These addresses are, in fact,
located in Colorado City, Arizona. Therefore, the applications for Utah registrations
did not disclose the fact that the defendant was a resident of Arizona/7 R. 67.
The magistrate noted that "[i]t appeared that correspondence mailed to the
addresses provided in the registration applications would reach the defendant
because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona share a post office/' R. 68. He
noted further that the investigator "had no difficulty in physically locating these
addresses . . . . " Id.
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The magistrate found that" defendant paid substantially less in property taxes
and registration fees by registering the subject motor vehicles in the State of Utah
rather than in the State of Arizona/7 Id. "However," he continued, "this court has
no legal interest in the enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or penal
statues of the sovereign State of Arizona." Id.
The magistrate's order did not specify what element of the charged offense was
unsupported by probable cause. However, he did tell the prosecutor, "I fully expect
you to take it up . . . and let my superiors, either in the court of appeals or the
supreme court, correct any error that I make by dismissing this matter as a matter
of law." R.90:13.
Sl.nuLii'tJ of review. Magistrates have "some discretion to apply the probable
cause standard" to the facts presented at a preliminary hearing. State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29, If 34, 137 P.3d 787. "This discretion is limited, however, because in the
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is
limited. Accordingly, an appellate court should grant commensurate limited
deference to a magistrate's application of the bindover standard to the facts of each
case." Id. The magistrate here was not called upon to make any credibility
determinations. The facts were uncontested.
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Bindover standard. "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show
'probable cause7 at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to
establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it/" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,% 10,20 R3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger,
896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995)) (additional internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This is the sole function of the preliminary hearing. Utah Const., art. I, §
12. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must . . . produce
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged/' Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 15
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The quantum of evidence
necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a bindover is "relatively
low" — the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^f 10,16 (additional
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 18.
In applying this standard, "the magistrate must view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9,110. In particular, "[k]nowledge or intent is
a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light
of all the accompanying circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^j 10,
988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted).
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Analysis. The elements of the instant charge are uncomplicated. Defendant
was charged with false evidences of title or registration under Utah Code Ann. § 41la-1315(2) (West 2004):
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to:
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material
fact in an application under this chapter;
The application referred to is the application described in Utah Code Ann. §
41-la-209(l) (West 2004) ("An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under this
part shall apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the division.).
This application must include the applicant's "bona fide residence":
(2) The application for registration shall include:
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the owner,
or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm, association, or
corporation;
§ 41-la-209(2)(b). Here, to bind defendant over for trial, the prosecution at
minimum bore the burden of establishing probable cause that defendant (1)
knowingly (2) made a false statement (3) on an application to register a motor
vehicle in the State of Utah. The false statement defendant is charged with making
is that his "bona fide residence" was located in Utah, whereas in fact it was located
in Arizona. Thus, the prosecution here needed to offer some evidence that
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defendant (1) knowingly (2) listed a false residence (3) on a Utah motor vehicle
registration application.
The prosecution made this showing.

At the preliminary hearing, the

prosecution presented evidence that defendant, on his vehicle registration
application, falsely stated that his address was located in Utah. R. 89:11-12,19-23,
46-49; State's Ex. 1,2,3,4,5, 6, 7, 8. The evidence was unchallenged, and even the
magistrate found that the locations defendant had identified on his applications as
Hildale, Utah addresses "are, in fact, located in Colorado City, Arizona/' R. 67.
Thus, defendant's statement on his vehicle registration application was false.
That defendant acted knowingly may be inferred from his "conduct viewed in
light of all the accompanying circumstances." Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^f 10.
People generally know what state they live in. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution required the magistrate to infer that defendant
knew he resided in Arizona, not Utah. This inference is strengthened by testimony
that an investigator for the Arizona Department of Economic Security was
investigating defendant for welfare fraud. R. 89: 19-20, 29-30. That testimony
suggests that defendant had claimed welfare benefits from the State of Arizona,
demonstrating that he knew he lived in Arizona, not Utah as stated on his vehicle
registration application.
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Accordingly, the prosecution did produce "believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged/7 Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 15 (additional internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The magistrate identified no element of the offense that the prosecutor had left
unsupported. Rather, he dismissed the charges because the prosecutor failed to
prove facts that are not elements of the charged offense. For example, he noted that
defendant's false statement did not actually conceal his whereabouts: the
investigator "had no difficulty in physically locating these addresses" and "[i]t
appeared that correspondence mailed to the addresses provided in the registration
applications would reach the defendant because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City,
Arizona share a post office." R. 68.
In addition, the magistrate in effect determined that defendant's apparent
motive--to evade Arizona's higher registration fees —somehow excused his
compliance with the Utah statute: "[T]his court has no legal interest in the
enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or penal statues of the sovereign
State of Arizona." Id.
The magistrate's concerns are misplaced. The State is not attempting to enforce
an Arizona statute, but a Utah statute. The Utah Legislature has determined that the
State of Utah has an interest in people not lying to it on vehicle registration
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applications and has passed a statute prohibiting this conduct. That the magistrate
would graft additional elements on to this crime, such as that the State of Utah suffer
financial loss or that the accused intend to conceal his whereabouts, is legally
irrelevant. Courts "'have nothing to do with what the law ought to be. [They] must
be guided by the law as it is.'" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135, 202 P. 377,380 (1921)).
The magistrate's confusion may be traceable in part to a misreading of State v.
Bland, 93 Utah 384, 73 P.2d 964 (1937). That case involved the interpretation of a
different provision of the predecessor of the statute under which defendant was
charged.
Herschel Bland was convicted of fraudulently using a false name in an
application for registration of an automobile. Id. at 964. He gave his name as Bert
Peterson. Id. He was convicted of violating section 125, article 10, chapter 46, Laws
of Utah 1935:
Any person who fraudulently uses a false orfictitious name in any application for
the registration ofa vehicle or a certificate of title, or knowingly makes a false
statement or knowingly conceals a material fact or otherwise commits a
fraud in any such application, is guilty of a felony.
Bland, 73 P.2d at 964 (emphasis in original). The supreme court reversed his
conviction. Its decision was based on the statutory teimfraudulent: "we do not think
the mere use of a different name than his own makes out a prima facie case of
12

'fraudulent use of a false name/" Id. at 965 (quoting section 125, art. 10, chap. 46,
Laws of Utah 1935). In support of this assertion, the court stated that "[m]any
persons are better known by a stage name than by a real name." Id.1 For such a
person to give their real name "would be more likely to throw officers off guard or
conceal their identity." Id. Thus, "the word 'fraudulent' was inserted so that
persons who habitually used a fixed pseudonym would not be held guilty of a
felony." Id. Hence, the word's inclusion "must have been intended to require proof
that defendant gave a wrong name with a bad motive, and that the mere use of a
name other than his own does not by itself make out a prima facie case of bad
motive . . . ." Id. Absent such proof, the court reversed Bland's conviction. Id.
Bland does not control the case at bar, because Bland and defendant were
charged under different statutory subsections. Bland was charged with fraudulently
using a false or fictitious name in a vehicle registration application. See id. at 964.
The provision at issue in that case is currently codified as subsection (1) of section
41-la-1315. In contrast, defendant here was charged with knowingly making a false
statement or knowingly concealing a material fact in a vehicle registration
application. See R. 1-2. The provision at issue in this case appears as subsection (2)
of section 41-la-1315.
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The court offered no support for this curious assertion.
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The distinction is dispositive. The supreme court's analysis in Bland hinged on
the word fraudulently, which appears in subsection (l)'s phrase "fraudulently uses
a false or fictitious name/' See Bland, 73 P.2d at 964. Subsection (2) does not require
that the actor act fraudulently, merely that he "knowingly make a false statement or
knowingly conceal a material fact." § 41-la-1315(l). Defendant did that.
To follow Bland here would require this Court to read the wordfraudulently into
subsection (2) — "to insert... a substantive [term] by judicial fiat." State v. Wallace,
2006 UT 86,19,150 P.3d 540 (quoting Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, \ 16,133 P.3d
370) (insertion in original). This is not the court's role. As our supreme court
recently stated, "Our task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to
correct or revise them. When the words are clear, however incongruous they may
appear in policy application, we will interpret them as written, leaving to the
legislature the task of making corrections when warranted." Id. The role of the
judicial branch is to enforce the statute, not "the policy behind the statute." Paul, 860
P.2d at 994.
The State adduced believable evidence of all the elements of the Utah statute
under which defendant was charged. The magistrate never found otherwise, and
nothing more was required. Accordingly, defendant should have been bound over
for trial on the charged counts.
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CONCLUSION
The magistrate's order of dismissal should be reversed, the charges against
defendant reinstated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18, Tf 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 (Cal.
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
RESPECTFULLY submitted on

March 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

C VOROS, JR.
stant Attorney General
:
, Appeals Division
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copies of the foregoing brief of

appellee were • hand-delivered to an agent of ^mailed to the following:
GARY W. PENDLETON
301 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
ORDER DISMISSING
INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 061500552 FS
TERRUX C. JOHNSON,
Judge James L. Shumate
Defendant.

From the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing conducted herein, it was
apparent that the defendant, while a resident of Colorado City, Arizona, registered certain motor
vehicles in the State of Utah using addresses on West Arizona Avenue and North Juniper Street.
While the addresses provided on the Utah registration applications accurately located the
defendant's residence and Meadowayne Dairy on the Hildale/Colorado City grid, the locations
were identified as Hildale, Utah addresses. These addresses are, in fact, located in Colorado
City, Arizona. Therefore, the applications for Utah registrations did not disclose the fact that the
defendant was a resident of Arizona.

1

It appeared that correspondence mailed to the addresses provided in the
registration applications would reach the defendant because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City,
Arizona share a post office. Furthermore, the persons how investigated this matter had no
difficulty in physically locating these addresses after driving the streets of Hildale, Utah and
Colorado City, Arizona.
The defendant paid substantially less in property taxes and registration fees by
registering the subject motor vehicles in the State of Utah rather than in the State of Arizona.
However, this court has no legal interest in the enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or
penal statutes of the sovereign State of Arizona.
The court, having reviewed the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing,
having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, made the
following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Information charging the defendant, Terrill C.
Johnson, with eight counts of the offense of FALSE EVIDENCES OF TITLE AND
REGISTRATION, a Second Degree Felony, is DISMISSED.
U
DATED this H

G

^
day of September, 2006.

Approved as to form and content:

Wayne Caldwell
Deputy Washington County Attorney

JanjeSX. Shumate
District Court Judge

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this day of September, 2006,1 did personally deliver
or cause to be delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING
INFORMATION to Wayne Caldwell at the Washington County Attorney's Office, 178 North
200 East, Saint George, Utah 84770.

Gary W. Pendleton
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